Group ring based public key cryptosystems by Mittal, Gaurav et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
07
26
2v
3 
 [m
ath
.G
R]
  1
0 J
ul 
20
20
GROUP RING BASED PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Gaurav Mittal1,2,Sunil Kumar2,Shiv Narain3, and Sandeep Kumar2
1Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee, Roorkee, India
2DRDO, India
3Department of Mathematics, Arya P. G. College, Panipat, India
emails: gmittal@ma.iitr.ac.in, sunil kumar@hqr.drdo.in,
math.shiv@gmail.com, sandeepkumar@hqr.drdo.in
Abstract. In this paper, we propose two cryptosystems based on group rings and existing
cryptosystem. First one is Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem whose
security is greater than security of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves discrete logarithmic
problem (ECDLP). Second is ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem, which is anal-
ogous to ElGamal public key cryptosystem but has comparatively greater security. Examples
are also given for both the proposed cryptosystems.
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1. Introduction
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques for achieving Privacy, Authentication,
Integrity and Non-repudiation, i.e. PAIN. For the secrecy and authenticity of sensitive infor-
mation, cryptosystems are used extensively. The one and only aim of these cryptosystems is to
ensure end-to-end communication between two or more parties such that the information en-
crypted at one end is understood only at the other end. For end-to-end secure communication,
various symmetric ciphers have been developed till 1970’s, for instance, classical substitution
ciphers, transposition ciphers, rotor machines (see [20]) etc. Since then many symmetric ciphers
came in the picture but security-wise some of the best known are DES and AES both based
on the concepts of confusion and diffusion introduced by Claude Shannon [17], however, in the
current scenario DES is no longer in use because the key length does not withstand against the
brute force attack.
Some of the greatest revolutions in cryptography are the development of asymmetric or public
key cryptography and key authentication protocols. The well known public key cryptosystesms
or ciphers till date are RSA, ElGamal, NTRU (see [9, 20]) etc. Keeping the keys out of the
reach of foe is extraordinarily imperative in public key cryptosystems. This leads to the concept
of key authentication protocols. Various key authentication protocols have been developed by
many researchers in the past (cf. [20] for more details). Very recently, Chandrashekhar et al.
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[6] proposed a new efficient and secure authentication protocol for discrete logarithm define over
multiplicative group based cryptosystem using the basic methodology.
The security of most of the public key cryptosystems as well as key authentication protocols
depend on the hardness of solving some underlying mathematical problem with a trapdoor like
integer factorization, discrete logarithmic, shortest non-zero vector in the lattice etc. and most
of these problems arise in number theory [9]. Combinatorial group theory has also attracted
much interest for the construction of public key cryptosystems [1, 8, 19]. The hard underlying
mathematical problem associated with most of these cryptosystems is conjugacy search problem
which can be considered as the generalization of discrete logarithm problem to groups other
than Fp, where p is some prime.
Hill cipher and Affine Hill cipher [20] are well known classical ciphers extensively used in
symmetric cryptography. But, now a days these ciphers are not only limited to symmetric key
cryptography. Using the classical Affine Hill cipher, a public key cryptosystem has been devel-
oped in [21] based on modulation of prime number. We also refer to references in [21] for more
literature on the public key cryptosystems that are developed using symmetric cryptosystems.
Elliptic curves over finite fields are very important from the cryptographic point of view (cf.
[12, 13]). The interesting problem of adding two points on an elliptic curve was a very subtle
issue and theory behind it leads to the fascinating field of mathematics known as Algebraic
Geometry. For additional reading devoted to elliptic curve cryptography, see [4, 14].
To the best of our knowledge, algebraic structure known as group rings has not been used in
cryptography upto first decade of 21st century. Hurley [11] discussed the various applications of
group rings to the areas of communication. In [10], the first known symmetric key cryptosystem
using group rings was demonstrated with few examples which show how to combine RSA and
unit of group ring and how to use large power of a unit as a public key but no public key
cryptosystem was discussed explicitly.
In this paper, we discuss two novel group rings based public key cryptosystems. First one
is Elliptic Elgamal type group ring public key cryptosystem and second one is ElGamal type
group ring public key cryptosystem without the involvement of Elliptic curves. Elliptic ElGamal
public key cryptosystem which is analogous to ElGamal is discussed in [9]. The main difficulty
with this cryptosystem is non-obvious way of attaching the plaintext messages and elements of
elliptic curve over finite field. We try to resolve this problem in our work by combining the
elements of group ring with that of elliptic curves in a unique manner. The sounding effect of
these proposed public key cryptosystems is their enhanced security in comparison to that of
existing cryptosystems. This enhanced security can be well understood for traditional classical
computers but in the coming era of quantum computers where public key cryptosystems (in
particular, RSA, ECDSA) are no longer safe [3, 16, 18], this can play a vital role because of the
involvement of two operations in group ring which are connected via distributive law.
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Rest of the paper is designed as follows: Section 2 pertains to preliminary definitions and
discussion of both the novel cryptosystems. Examples related to these schemes are discussed
in Section 3. Section 4 is related to discussion of availability of units of group rings and last
section comprises some concluding remarks.
2. Cryptographic systems in group rings
In the present section, we propose two public key cryptosystems in group rings. But before
that, we provide some preliminary definitions and results requisite for our work.
Definition 2.1. Group Ring: Let R be a ring with unity and G be a group. The set
RG =
{ t∑
j=1
rjgj : rj ∈ R, gj ∈ G
}
of all finite sums is known as group ring. As name suggests, RG is a group, ring, and module
over R. See [15] for more information on group rings. For a, b ∈ RG, a ∗ b denotes the product
of a and b.
Definition 2.2. Unit of a group ring: Let u ∈ RG. This u is a unit of RG if there exists an
element v ∈ RG such that
u ∗ v = v ∗ u = 1.
Set of all units of RG forms a group under the operation ∗.
Definition 2.3. Normalized unit of a group ring: Let u =
∑k
i=1 αigi ∈ RG with αi ∈ R and
gi ∈ G be a unit of RG. This u is said to be normalized if
α1 + α2 + · · ·+ αk = 1.
Set denoted by V (RG) of all the normalized units of RG forms a group under the operation ∗.
Definition 2.4. Discrete Logarihtmic Problem (DLP): Let g, h be two elements of Fp such that
h is some power of g. Then DLP is the problem of finding an integer n such that h = gn.
Definition 2.5. Discrete Logarihtmic Problem (DLP) in group ring: Let u be an element of
RG and v be another element of RG which is some power of u. Then, DLP in group ring is
determination of an integer x such that v = ux.
Definition 2.6. Elliptic Curve: Consider the Weierstrass equation
E : Y 2 = X3 +RX + S.
Set of all the solutions of E together with an extra point O that lives at infinity is an elliptic
curve. Here R and S are constants which satisfy 4R3 + 27S2 6= 0.
Further, if we consider only those elements of E which also belong to Fp × Fp, then the set
E(Fp) =
{
(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp and y2 = x3 +Rx+ S
} ∪ {O}
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is an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp with R,S ∈ Fp.
Definition 2.7. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarihtmic Problem (ECDLP): Let P,Q be two points
on elliptic curve E(Fp). Then ECDLP is the problem of determination of an integer n such that
Q = nP , provided such an integer exists.
Next, we give the explicit formulas to add and subtract any two points on an elliptic curve.
For proof see [9,Theorem 5.6].
Theorem 2.1. Let P and Q be any two points on the elliptic curve E(Fp).
(1) If P = O, then P +Q = Q. Similarly, if Q = O, then P +Q = P .
(2) Otherwise, write P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2).
(3) If x1 = x2 and y1 + y2 = 0, then P +Q = O.
(4) Otherwise, define λ by
λ =


3x21 +R
2y1
if P = Q
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 if P 6= Q.
Then P +Q = (x3, y3) with
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1.
Now, we discuss the important task of associating each data or number to be encrypted with
the elements of group ring RG where R is the ring with identity and G = {g1, g2, · · · } is either
finite or countable group. In our study, we either consider R = Fp for some prime p > 0 or
R = Z.
2.1. Connection between given data and elements of group ring. Suppose that all the
digits of the data to be encrypted are elements of R, for instance, data consists of elements
ranging from 0 to p − 1 for some prime p and R = Zp. Given any arbitrary data, write it
in blocks of length t where t ∈ Z+. Further, any arbitrary data block m = m1m2 · · ·mt with
mi ∈ R can be considered as an element of group ring RG via the following representation
r =
t∑
i=1
migi, gi ∈ G.
For above representation to be unique, order of G must be atleast t and therefore we assume
the same, i.e. |G| ≥ t and can be atmost countable. If length of the message is not a multiple
of t, then padding can be done with 0′s.
2.2. Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem. Given a message r =∑t
i=1migi, write it uniquely as a row vector
r =
[
m1 m2 · · · · · · mt
]
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where mi is the coefficient of element gi in r. Choose a point P = (x1, y1) on the elliptic curve
E(Fp) and a unit u of group ring RG such that order of u is large. This unit is not made public.
Further, secretly choose two positive integers (n1, n2) and use these integers to compute
Q = n1P = (x2, y2) and A = u
n2
where A ∈ RG. Set (P,Q,A) as the public key for encryption and (n1, u−n2) as the private key
for decryption. Now select a random one time key n3 and let n3Q = (x3, y3). This key is used
for encrypting only one message or some fixed number of blocks that needs to be decided in the
beginning and then discarded.
2.2.1. Encryption. For encryption, message r is encrypted using public key to obtain the cipher-
text (C1, C2) where
C1 = n3P, C2 = (r ⊕ n3Q) ∗ A
where the ⊕ operation is defined as
r ⊕ n3Q =
[
m1 m2 · · · · · · mt
]⊕ (x3, y3)
=
[
m1 + x3 + y3 m2 + x4 + y4 · · · · · · mt + xt+2 + yt+2
]
with
n3Q = (x3, y3), 2n3Q = (x4, y4), 3n3Q = (x5, y5), · · · , tn3Q = (xt+2, yt+2)
and since mi, xi, yi ∈ Fp, above addition is defined. Rationale behind the ⊕ operation is to
combine an element of group ring with an element of elliptic curve such that the result is an
element of group ring. So, the ciphertext (C1, C2) has two parts where C1 is the element of
elliptic curve and C2 is the element of group ring. This ciphertext is then send to the receiver
say Alice.
Remark 2.1. If the message m is of the form
[
m1 0 m3 m4 0 · · · 0
]
,
then we can simply encrypt it in the form
[
m1 0 m3 m4
]
. But the 0 entries in between
the non-zero entries of the message cannot be skipped and needs to be considered in order to
uniquely obtain the plaintext from ciphertext.
Remark 2.2. Suppose that the operation ⊕ is of the form
r ⊕ n3Q =
[
m1 m2 · · · · · · mt
]⊕ (x3, y3)
=
[
m1 + x3 + y3 m2 + x3 + y3 · · · · · · mt + x3 + y3
]
where we are adding x3+ y3 in every message digit. This added block can leak some information
about the message if there are consecutive zeros in the message. To avoid such a situation we
added the multiples of (x3, y3) in the message digits.
5
2.2.2. Decryption. Since Alice knows u−n2 , she computes
C2 ∗ u−n2 = (r ⊕ n3Q) ∗ A ∗ u−n2 = r ⊕ n3Q.
Alice also knows n1 and she use this to obtain
n1C1 = n1n3P = n3n1P = n3Q.
Thereafter, she computes the multiples of n3Q and perform the decryption operation ⊖, i.e.
(C2 ∗ u−n2)⊖ n1C1 = (r ⊕ n3Q)⊖ (x3, y3)
=
[
m1 + x3 + y3 m2 + x4 + y4 · · · · · · mt + xt+2 + yt+2
]⊖ (x3, y3)
=
[
m1 m2 · · · · · · mt
]
=
t∑
i=1
migi = r
where ⊖ operation means subtracting x3 + y3, x4 + y4, · · · , xt+2 + yt+2 from the corresponding
elements of row vector.
Remark 2.3. We can also consider R = Z in Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key
cryptosystem in place of Fp. In that case, whole encryption scheme remains same with the only
difference that operation ⊕ involves usual addition instead of addition modulo p.
Remark 2.4. For Elliptic ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem, we can also con-
sider fields of different characteristics. For instance, we can consider E(Fp) and R = Zq where
p and q are some primes. If p < q, then the operation ⊕ involves addition modulo q and we
directly add the elements of elliptic curves to that of group ring. If p > q, then first we need to
convert the elements of elliptic curve to elements modulo q and then apply operation ⊕ which
again involves addition modulo q. An example related to this situation is discussed in Section 3.
2.2.3. Logic behind the name. Proposed encryption scheme is a novel approach involving the
important operation of combining the elements of a group ring with those of Elliptic curve. The
parameters involved are similar to ElGamal and hence the cryptosystem is named as Elliptic
ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem.
2.2.4. Security analysis of the scheme. To obtain the plaintext from ciphertext, adversary in
between needs to:
(1) solve ECDLP.
(2) determine inverse of power a unit or unit from its power.
In F∗p, there are algorithms for solving DLP and the fastest known algorithm has subexponential
running time known as index calculus method [9]. But there are no subexponential running time
algorithms for solving ECDLP which makes elliptic curves very useful in cryptography. The fast
known algorithm takes approximately
√
p times to solve ECDLP (for example Pollard’s ρmethod
[9]), i.e. to say that there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve ECDLP.
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Now we discuss the hardness of inverse computation problem in group rings. There exist units
which can be constructed by some formula (let’s say known type units), for instance, unipotent
units, central units, Bass cyclic units, Bicyclic units [15]. On taking power of a known type unit,
resultant unit may not be of known type and it becomes computationally infeasible to determine
the inverse of a such a unit for large groups, i.e. to say that determination of unit from its power
introduces the difficulty of DLP in group rings (how much difficult DLP is in group rings is
discussed in subsection 2.3.3). Moreover, we can also combine the units of known type to get
units of unknown type, for instance A = (u1u2)
n1 where u1 and u2 are units of known type and
it becomes computationally infeasible to obtain the inverse of such a unit without knowing the
inverse of constituent units. So, in general we can say that it is safe to use power of units, power
of product of units as the public keys.
Hence, the novel scheme is comparatively more secure than the schemes whose security relies
on solving ECDLP, e.g. Elliptic Elgamal public key cryptosystem. In the current scenario,
recommended key sizes (in bits) are 2048, 3072, 7680, · · · for RSA and Diffie-Hellman whereas
224, 256, 384, · · · for the elliptic curves. This means elliptic curves have an edge over RSA and
Diffie-Hellman in terms of key size despite the highly structured nature of E(Fp). If we consider
an elliptic curve over a prime p having size 224 bits, then we can say that Elliptic ElGamal
type group ring public key cryptosystem has a security equivalent to security of cryptosystems
on E(Fp′) where size of p
′ is 224 + k bits for some positive integer k where k depends on the
structure of the unit group of group ring.
Now we introduce our second cryptosystem. For this cryptosystem too, parameters involved
are similar to ElGamal (although cryptosystem is entirely different) and hence we name it as
ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem.
2.3. ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem. Secretly choose a unit u ∈ RG
of large order and two positive integers n1 and n2. Then find A1 = u
n1 . Choose another unit
v ∈ RG of large order (open in public domain) and set A2 = vn2 . Declare (A1, A2, v) as the
public key and (A−11 , n2) as the corresponding private key. Now as in ElGamal, select a random
ephemeral key k.
2.3.1. Encryption. For encryption, find the ciphertext (C1, C2) where
C1 = v
k, C2 = (r ∗ A1) ∗ Ak2.
This ciphertext is then send to Alice.
2.3.2. Decryption. As the second part n2 of private key is known to Alice, she finds (C1)
−n2 and
use this to obtain
C2 ∗ v−n2k = r ∗ A1.
On multiplying above with A−11 (first part of private key), Alice gets the message r.
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2.3.3. Security of the scheme. To obtain the plaintext from ciphertext, Eve needs n2 and A
−1
1
which requires the determination of unit from its power and inverse of a given unit respectively.
In other words, Eve’s first task is to solve the DLP in group ring and second task is inverse
computation problem which is already discussed in Subsection 2.2.4. So, we only discuss the
hardness of DLP in group rings. For that, we need to measure the number of necessary operations
required to efficiently compute the discrete log. Let G be an arbitrary group and g ∈ G with
|g| = n for n ∈ Z+. If computing gx for some x ∈ Z+ is treated as a single operation, then
discrete log can be computed in at most n operations via brute force attack. If n is a r (≥ 80)
bit number, then on an average, brute force attack takes O(2r) operations to compute discrete
log which is exponential time and therefore is no longer practical. Now on considering the same
situation of discrete log computation in group rings, one can easily see that brute force is again
impractical because a group ring involves two operations connected via distributive law whereas
a group involves only one operation. Further, we know that index calculus method is the fastest
known subexponential algorithm to solve DLP in groups (already discussed in Subsection 2.2.4),
but no such algorithm is known to solve DLP in group rings. However, one thing we can claim
that currently there exists no polynomial time algorithm to solve DLP in group rings because if
there is some algorithm, then it is also implementable on groups. But the best known for groups
is index calculus method.
So, we can say that currently there is no threat to DLP from classical computers for properly
chosen groups as well as group rings. But there exist quantum algorithms to solve DLP in
finite groups, however, nothing is known to solve DLP in group rings or non-abelian groups [3].
Therefore, we can say that DLP in group rings is safer than DLP in groups, even in quantum
word in the sense that no known literature is available. Hence, we conclude that ElGamal type
group ring public key cryptosystem is more secure than the existing ElGamal cryptosystem.
Remark 2.5. For ElGamal type group ring public key cryptosystem, R can be ring of integers
also. In that case too, we write the message in blocks of length t with |G| ≥ t. Example involving
integral group ring is discussed in next section.
3. Examples
In this section, we discuss some examples of the group ring public key cryptosystems defined
in the preceding section. From now onwards, we write GRPKC as a short form for group ring
public key cryptosystem. Most of the results including determination of units, computation of
powers of units and their corresponding inverses can be obtained using GAP (Groups, Algorithm
and Programming) [7], MAGMA or MATLAB.
3.1. Elliptic ElGamal type GRPKC. For the better understanding of Elliptic ElGamal
type GRPKC, we give a simple example by considering the small parameters. Suppose that the
message m of arbitrary size consists of only English alphabets (this restriction is made only for
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understanding), let’s say {A, B, · · · , Z}. So, we map these alphabets on the elements of F29 by
the mapping
{A→ 0, B→ 1, C→ 2, · · · , Z→ 25}.
Suppose the message is “ARMY”. We consider G = C29 = < g >, i.e. cyclic group of order 29.
In terms of element of group ring, we write the message in the form
r = 0e+ 17g + 12g2 + 24g3 =
[
0 17 12 24
]
.
Consider the elliptic curve
E(F29) : y
2 = x3 + 4x+ 20 mod 29
and a point P = (8, 10) on it. We consider the trivial unit g of F29G and choose the private key
(n1, g
−n2) = (4, g−3). Public key is (P,Q,A) where
Q = (6, 17), A = g3.
Let n3 = 3 and using Theorem 2.1, we get
n3Q = (3, 28), 2n3Q = (24, 22), 3n3Q = (8, 19), 4n3Q = (5, 22).
Now we find the ciphertext (C1, C2) corresponding to message r. Using n3 = 3, we get C1 =
3P = (16, 2). Further, we have
(r ⊕ n3Q) =
[
0 17 12 24
]⊕ (3, 28)
=
[
0 + 3 + 28 17 + 24 + 22 12 + 8 + 19 24 + 5 + 22
]
=
[
2 5 10 22
]
.
Above yields
C2 = (r + n3Q) ∗ A = 2g3 + 5g4 + 10g5 + 22g6 =
[
0 0 0 2 5 10 22
]
.
Therefore the ciphertext is
(C1, C2) =
(
(16, 2),
[
0 0 0 2 5 10 22
])
.
For decryption, Alice first of all use the second part of her private key to get
C2 ∗ g−3 =
[
0 0 0 2 5 10 22
] ∗ g−3 = (2g3 + 5g4 + 10g5 + 22g6) ∗ g−3
= 2 + 5g + 10g2 + 22g3 =
[
2 5 10 22
]
.
Now Alice use first part n1 of her private key to obtain
n1C1 = 4(16, 2) = (3, 28)
and multiples of (3, 28). Clearly Alice needs to compute only 4 multiples of (3, 28) as the
remaining terms are zero in C2 ∗ g−3. Decrypted message is
(C2 ∗ g−3)⊖ (3, 28) =
[
2 5 10 22
]⊖ (3, 28)
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=
[
2− 3− 28 5− 24− 22 10 − 8− 19 22− 5− 22]
=
[
0 17 12 24
]
= ARMY.
We have chosen trivial unit for this example so that it can be done manually. In the upcoming
examples, we consider non-trivial units which actually make the scheme worthy.
3.2. Elliptic ElGamal type GRPKC for R = Z and G = D10. In this subsection, we
provide an example which highlights the importance of Remark 2.3. We consider the integral
group ring of group G = D10 which means message has integer values. G can be represented as
G = 〈r, s | r5 = 1 = s2, sr = r4s〉 = {1, r, r2, r3, r4, s, rs, r2s, r3s, r4s}.
Consider the element u = 1 − 2r − 2r2 + r3 + 3r4 of RG. It can be verified that u is a unit of
RG with u−1 = −2 + 3r − 2r2 + r3 + r4. Now, consider the elliptic curve
E(F263) : y
2 = x3 + 2x+ 3 mod 263
and a point P = (200, 39) on it. Choose the private key (10, u−8) with the corresponding public
key (P,Q,A) where
Q = 10P = (47, 78), A = u8 = −1576239 + 602070r + 1948339r2 + 602070r3 − 1576239r4
and
u−8 = 602070 + 602070r − 1576239r2 + 1948339r3 − 1576239r4
Let n3 = 5 and using Theorem 2.1, we get
n3Q = (180, 115), 2n3Q = (5, 123), 3n3Q = (128, 81), 4n3Q = (127, 213) 5n3Q = (17, 189)
6n3Q = (102, 90), 7n3Q = (74, 155), 8n3Q = (142, 89), 9n3Q = (144, 228) 10n3Q = (139, 12).
Now we find the ciphertext (C1, C2) corresponding to message
r′ =
[
1 2 − 1 6 0 8 0 3 9 − 5].
Using n3 = 5, we get C1 = 5P = (251, 155). Further, we have
(r′ ⊕ n3Q) =
[
1 2 − 1 6 0 8 0 3 9 − 5]⊕ (180, 115)
=
[
296 130 208 346 206 200 229 234 381 146
]
Above yields
C2 = (r
′ ⊕ n3Q) ∗A = 251904460 + 255117992r − 94232542r2 − 313356578r3 − 99432146r4
+277795332s + 294897228rs − 95538493r2s− 353942935r3s− 123209942r4s.
Therefore the ciphertext is (C1, C2). Decryption can be done similarly as shown in subsection
3.1. Clearly, this example shows the beautiful mixing of points of elliptic curve and the message.
Now we discuss an example as said in Remark 2.4.
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3.3. Elliptic ElGamal type GRPKC for R = F2 and G = D10. We assume that message is
in bits or in other words R = F2, G is Dihedral group of order 10 with the same representation
considered in last example. Clearly, the group ring RG has 1024 elements. Consider the element
u = r2 + r4 + s
of RG. It can be verified that u is a unit of RG with inverses
u−1 = 1 + r + r3 + r4 + s+ rs+ r4s.
Rest of the setting including choice of elliptic curve, selection of point P on elliptic curve, public
key and private key is exactly same to the one considered in last example. So, the private and
public keys are (10, u−8) and (P,Q,A) respectively where
Q = 10P = (47, 78), A = u8 = 1 + r + r2 + rs+ r2s+ r3s+ r4s and u−8 = r4 + rs+ r4s.
Let n3 = 5 and using Theorem 2.1 we can get the multiples of n3Q as done in last example.
Now we find the ciphertext (C1, C2) corresponding to message
r′ =
[
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
]
.
Using n3 = 5, we get C1 = 5P = (251, 155). Further, we have
(r′ ⊕ n3Q) =
[
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
]⊕ (180, 115)
=
[
296 128 209 340 206 192 229 231 372 151
]
mod 2
=
[
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
]
.
Above yields
C2 = (r
′ ⊕ n3Q) ∗ A = 1 + r2 + r4 + s+ rs+ r4s =
[
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
]
.
Therefore the ciphertext is (C1, C2). For decryption, Alice first of all use the second part of
her private key to get C2 ∗ A−1. Now Alice use first part n1 of her private key to obtain
n1C1 = (180, 115) and its multiples. Clearly Alice needs to compute only 10 multiples of
(180, 115) which is decided by the length of group. These multiples are then added to C2 ∗A−1
under modulo 2 to get the original message.
Now we discuss some examples for the feel of ElGamal GRPKC. All the three examples
discussed above involve small parameters, but for the practical implementation of these schemes,
we need to work with large numbers or in other words, large power of units. In the next example,
we take care of this thing and consider large (reasonably) parameters.
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3.4. ElGamal type GRPKC for an abelian group. Let r = 11110100001 is the message,
R = F2 and G is cyclic group of order 11, i.e.
G = {gi : 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 10}
and we denote gi = g
i. Clearly, the group ring RG has 2048 elements. Given message as an
element of group ring is
r = 1 + g + g2 + g3 + g5 + g10 =
[
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
]
.
Take a unit u = 1+ g+ g3 (verify that u−1 = 1+ g+ g3 + g6 + g7 + g8 + g10) having order 1023
and calculate
A1 = u
400 = g2 + g4 + g6 + g7 + g10.
Further, choose another unit
v = 1 + g + g2 + g4 + g5 + g6 + g8 + g9 + g10 with v−1 = 1 + g + g3 + g6 + g9
and a secret positive integer n2 = 33. Public key is (A1, A2, v) with A2 = v
33. Private key is
(A−11 , 33) with
A−11 = 1 + g + g
2 + g5 + g7 + g8 + g10.
Using public key the obtained ciphertext with ephemeral key k = 19 is (C1, C2) where
C1 = v
19 = g5 + g7 + g9
and
C2 = (r ∗ A1) ∗ Ak2 = (r ∗ u400) ∗ v627 = 1 + g2 + g4 + g6 + g9 + g10
=
[
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
]
.
After obtaining the ciphertext (C1, C2), Alice computes (C2 ∗C−n21 ) ∗A−11 using her private key
to get the message.
Next example is related to Integral ElGamal GRPKC.
3.5. ElGamal type GRPKC for R = Z and G = C8. Let RG be the integral group ring
with G = C8 = 〈x〉, cyclic group of order 8. We denote gi = xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and consider the
message blocks of length 8 for encryption. Let
r =
[
0 1 − 10 17 0 0 0 − 4]
is the message to be encrypted. In terms of element of group ring, r can be written as
r = x− 10x2 + 17x3 − 4x7.
Here we choose small parameters otherwise the expressions becomes so large to print here but
one can choose arbitrary large numbers. Consider the element u = 2e + x − x3 − x4 − x5 + x7
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of RG. It can be verified that u is a unit of RG with u−1 = 2e − x+ x3 − x4 + x5 − x7 having
infinite order. Take n1 = 2 and calculate
A1 = u
2 = 9e+ 6x− 6x3 − 8x4 − 6x5 + 6x7 with A−11 = 9e− 6x+ 6x3 − 8x4 + 6x5 − 6x7.
Further, consider another unit
v = 50e+35x− 35x3 − 49x4 − 35x5 +35x7 with v−1 = 50e− 35x+35x3 − 49x4 +35x5 − 35x7
of RG and secret positive integer n2 = 2. Public key is (A1, A2, v) where
A2 = v
2 = 9801e + 6930x − 6930x3 − 9800x4 − 6930x5 + 6930x7
and private key is (A−11 , 2). Using public key the obtained ciphertext with ephemeral key k = 1
is (C1, C2) where C1 = v and
C2 = (r ∗A1) ∗ v2 = −4708320e − 2021231x + 1849862x2 + 4637345x3 + 4708320x4
+2021232x5 − 1849872x6 − 4637332x7 .
After obtaining the ciphertext (C1, C2), Alice computes (C2 ∗ v−2) ∗ u−1 using her private key
to obtain the message.
We end this section by giving an example in which we set a public key which is multiplication
of Bass cyclic unit and Bicyclic unit of integral group ring. This public key or unit has an
advantage that it is not of the known type and therefore it becomes computationally infeasible
to obtain the inverse of such a unit.
3.6. ElGamal type GRPKC for R = Z and G = S5. Let RG be the integral group ring
with G = S5, i.e. symmetric group of degree 5. We denote G = {gi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 119} (for any order
of our choice) and consider the message blocks of length 120 for encryption. Now before the
setting of public key, we recall the definitions of Bass cyclic and Bicyclic units.
Definition 3.1. Bass cyclic unit: Let g be an element of a group G having order n. Choose an
integer i coprime to n such that 1 < i < n− 1. Then the element
u = (1 + g + g2 + · · · + gi−1)φ(n) + 1− i
φ(n)
n
gˆ
is a unit of integral group ring RG. Here φ(n) denotes the Euler’s totient function and
gˆ = 1 + g + g2 + · · · + gn−1.
Definition 3.2. Bicyclic unit: Let g, h be two elements of a group G such that |g| = n. Then
the element
u = 1 + (g − 1)hgˆ
is a bicyclic unit of integral group ring RG corresponding to g and h where gˆ has the same
meaning as in Definition 3.1.
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For additional reading on these units see [15]. Let g = (1 4 2 5 3) be an element of S5 having
order 5 and i = 3. Then the Bass cyclic unit x corresponding to g and i is
x = 1 ∗ (1)− 2 ∗ (1 2 3 4 5) + 3 ∗ (1 3 5 2 4)− 2 ∗ (1 4 2 5 3) + 1 ∗ (1 5 4 3 2).
Further, consider elements (1 2 3 4 5) and (1 2) of S5 and use these to obtain the corresponding
bicyclic unit
y = 1 ∗ (1) + 1 ∗ (2 3 4 5)− 1 ∗ (2 5 4 3)− 1 ∗ (1 2) + 1 ∗ (1 2 4)(3 5)− 1 ∗ (1 3 4 5) + 1 ∗ (1 3)(2 5 4)
+1 ∗ (1 4 3 2)− 1 ∗ (1 4)(2 3 5) + 1 ∗ (1 5)− 1 ∗ (1 5 3)(2 4).
Let u = x ∗ y where
u = 1 ∗ (1)− 5 ∗ (4 5) + 5 ∗ (3 4)− 3 ∗ (2 3) + 3 ∗ (2 3 4 5)− 5 ∗ (1 2 3 4)− 2 ∗ (1 2 3 4 5) + 5 ∗ (1 2 3 5)
−3 ∗ (1 2 4 5) + 3 ∗ (1 2 4)(3 5) + 5 ∗ (1 3)(2 4 5) + 3 ∗ (1 3 5 2 4)− 5 ∗ (1 3 5)(2 4) + 3 ∗ (1 3)(2 5 4)
−3 ∗ (1 3 4)(2 5) + 3 ∗ (1 4 3 2)− 3 ∗ (1 4 2)(3 5)− 2 ∗ (1 4 2 5 3)− 5 ∗ (1 4 3)(2 5) + 5 ∗ (1 4)(2 5 3)
+1 ∗ (1 5 4 3 2)− 5 ∗ (1 5 3 2) + 5 ∗ (1 5 4 2)− 3 ∗ (1 5 4 3) + 3 ∗ (1 5)
with
u−1 = −2∗(1)−1∗(2 3 4 5)+1∗(2 5 4 3)+1∗(1 2)−2∗(1 2 3 4 5)−1∗(1 2 4)(3 5)+1∗(1 3 4 5)−1∗(1 3)(2 5 4)
+1∗(1 3 5 2 4)−1∗(1 4 3 2)+1∗(1 4)(2 3 5)+3∗(1 4 2 5 3)+1∗(1 5 4 3 2)−1∗(1 5)+1∗(1 5 3)(2, 4).
Choose another unit
v = −15 ∗ e + 6 ∗ (1 2 3 4 5) + 6 ∗ (1 3 5 2 4)− 15 ∗ (1 4 2 5 3) + 19 ∗ (1 5 4 3 2)
with
v−1 = 6 ∗ e+ 19 ∗ (1 2 3 4 5) + 6 ∗ (1 3 5 2 4)− 15 ∗ (1 4 2 5 3)− 15 ∗ (1 5 4 3 2).
Let the message to be encrypted is
r = −1 ∗ (2 3 4 5) + 2 ∗ (1 2 4)(3 5)− 3 ∗ (1 3)(2 5 4) + 4 ∗ (1 4 3 2)− 5 ∗ (1 5).
Take n1 = 1 and n2 = 3 which means public key is (A1 = u,A2 = v
3, v) where
v3 = 12816 ∗ e− 33552 ∗ (1 2 3 4 5) + 41473 ∗ (1 3 5 2 4)− 33552 ∗ (1 4 2 5 3) + 12816 ∗ (1 5 4 3 2).
Corresponding private key is (A−11 , 3). Using public key the obtained ciphertext with ephemeral
key k = 2 is (C1, C2) where
C1 = 273 ∗ e+ 273 ∗ (1 2 3 4 5)− 714 ∗ (1 3 5 2 4) + 883 ∗ (1 4 2 5 3)− 714 ∗ (1 5 4 3 2)
and
C2 = (r∗A1)∗(v3)2 = −56∗(1)+40∗(3 4 5)−228001425142∗(2 3 4 5)−26∗(2 3 5)−9∗(2 4 5)+51∗(2 4)(3 5)
−56∗(1 2 3 4 5)+40∗(1 2 3 5 4)−26∗(1 2 4 5 3)+51∗(1 2 5 4 3)−9∗(1 2 5 3 4)+51166299748∗(1 2 4)
(3 5)+51∗(1 3 2)−9∗(1 3 5 4 2)+40∗(1 3)(2 4)−56∗(1 3 5 2 4)+145212613069∗(1 3)(2 5 4)−26∗(1 3 2
5 4)−26∗(1 4 2)−286125243291∗(1 4 3 2)−9∗(1 4 3)+51∗(1 4 5)−56∗(1 4 2 5 3)+40∗(1 4 3 2 5)−
56∗ (1 5 4 3 2)+40∗ (1 5 2)+317747755613∗ (1 5)−26∗ (1 5)(3 4)−9∗ (1 5)(2 3)+51∗ (1 5 2 3 4).
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After obtaining the ciphertext (C1, C2), Alice can easily obtain the message.
4. Units of group rings using GAP
Both the encryption schemes of proposed cryptosystems involve units of group rings and
therefore in this section we discuss about the units of group rings. There are only few recipes
for the construction of units but still a vast literature is available on units of group rings. Using
LAGUNA package of GAP [5], group V (RG) of normalized units of group algebra RG with
R = Fp for some prime p > 0 and a finite p-group can be computed efficiently for smaller sizes
of RG. Further, as the unit group U(RG) of RG is F∗p × V (RG) which means we can efficiently
compute the complete unit group. But with the increase in size of |G|, GAP is very inefficient,
for instance, the computation of number of elements and generators of normalized unit group
of V (F5G) where G is a cyclic group of order 5
5 takes 38 minutes (approx) and program may
crash for groups of size greater than 5000. Despite of this drawback, GAP still covers a large
class of unit groups. For finite groups other than p-groups, units can be obtained using the
Wedderga package of GAP [2] with the additional restrictions that R is semisimple and |G| is
invertible in R. Basically Wedderga package is not for the calculation of units directly. Its main
purpose is to find the Wedderburn decomposition [15] of a group algebra. From this wedderburn
decomposition, we can easily obtain the structure of unit groups. Without the use of LAGUNA
and Wedderga we can also generate the units of integral group rings as well as any modular
group ring using GAP.
5. Conclusion
From security point of view, we already discussed that both the proposed cryprosystems have
greater security than that of existing cryptosystems. In the coming era of Quantum computers,
this enhanced security would play a great role because no such quantum algorithm is known
to solve DLP in group rings. Novelty of this work is the involvement of group rings and their
units in the field of public key cryptography. As mentioned there is a huge literature available
on the structure of unit group of group rings but very few articles are there in which unit group
is computed explicitly in terms of elements of group ring. Since the latter is more important
for frequent use of group rings in cryptography, much more efforts are required for the explicit
representation of the unit group in terms of the elements of group ring.
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